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

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Are Our Young Men To Have a Chance?

BY

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Blitzkreig, Its Political and Economic Challenge

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Box 532

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ARE OUR YOUNG MEN TO HAVE A CHANCE?

Only One Answer to the Challenge

By HENRY J. REILLY

Introduction

DRASTIC steps must be taken if the challenge to the political and economic principles on which the United States of America was founded and has been built is not to succeed in forcing us to change the very foundation of the country.

That is the only conclusion the author of this pamphlet can come to after two and a half years' studying the political, economic and military situation in Europe, including Europe's political dependencies on the African and Asiatic shores of the Mediterranean and Turkey. The author has spent a total of approximately twenty of the past thirty-six years in Europe, the Far East and Latin America. This extended experience should be sufficient to furnish a background of experience, knowledge and foreign contacts to enable a reasonably just conclusion to be drawn with respect to the present world situation.

What follows is not intended as an argument to prove that the United States should enter the present war as a belligerent. It is not intended to make any effort to prove what is right or wrong in the present state of world affairs.

It is intended to explain as briefly as possible from an objective point of view what world conditions are today, how they constitute a challenge to fundamental American principles, above all to the future of our young men and boys and the steps that are necessary to enable these youngsters to successfully meet the situation with which they are already challenged.

During the past few months since the author's return home, he has been more and more amazed at the failure of most of his compatriots to realize that, even though we may determinedly abstain from becoming a combatant in the present war, we cannot escape the political and economic results of the war, unless we are so prepared militarily that we can defend by force of arms, if necessary, the political and economic principles on which the country is founded.

An Estimate of the Situation

Our attempts, since the close of the last great war in 1918, to establish as fundamental throughout the world the political and economic systems in which we believe by means of international law, agreements and disarmament have utterly failed. The Washington Arms Conference of 1920-21, through the treaties which emanated from it, deprived the United States of America of the military power at sea and in the air above it which could have prevented Japan from tearing up these treaties and making herself master of the Western Pacific and the coast of Asia, from Kamchatka to Hainan Island. This distance on our Pacific Coast is equivalent to a position dominating it from Alaska in the North to Alcapulco, Mexico, in the South.

This undoubtedly would have been prevented without war because the six new battleships and five new battlecruisers then under construction, which we destroyed, were powerful enough alone to sink Japan's whole fleet. In other words, Japan would have heeded the warnings of our State Department as she did those of President Theodore Roosevelt when we possessed twenty-four first class battleships and Japan had but nine.

The details are easily available to anyone who cares to examine the printed records to prove that similarly in all questions affecting Europe and its various dependencies in other continents, disarmament conferences have always failed.

The application of sanctions by the League of Nations against Italy at the time of her invasion of Abyssinia failed primarily for reason of the lack of sufficient armed force—particularly on land—to make them effective.

The author knows, from the many high ranking military contacts he has in Europe, that even before the present war broke out the military world knew that an economic blockade against Germany would fail to bring her down. This group knew that only by beating Germany on the battlefield could she be beaten.

More than eight months of war has proven that view to be correct.

The point is not raised here as an argument in favor of the United States recruiting a large army to go to the help of the Allies.

It is being brought out because the economic system under which Germany is being operated at the present time, and which is gradually enlarging its field of operations, is in direct conflict with the economic systems of the United States, the British Empire and the French Empire.

The consequence is that, unless the German system is brought down,

the system of the three democracies, formerly of world-wide application, will be limited to that part of the world which they control.

Italy, most of the Balkan States, Spain, to a large extent, Russia, are already largely within the German bloc. The possibility exists that the more Japan takes over the control of the Chinese seacoast and the principal means of communication from the interior to that coast, the more she will be tempted to evade the serious financial difficulties of her present situation by joining that bloc.

This state of affairs already cuts down the opportunity of the United States to better its present economic situation by increasing its world trade. Therefore, even though we stay out of the war, this economic situation does affect ours and does lessen the opportunities of the rising generation of young Americans.

There is no need to go into the details of the challenge to our political institutions constituted by the existing form of government in Germany, Russia, Italy and Japan. The continued attacks on our form of government emanating from at least the first three of these countries leaves no doubt as to their hostility to it.

Political and Economic Challenge Supported by Military Action

If a comparison is made with the conditions obtaining in the war now going on in Europe with those which characterized the war of 1914-18, it is evident that Germany is in a far better position militarily than she was at any time during that war—the fourth[1] world war of modern times.

During that war the British and French blockaded her at sea, as they are doing now. However, Italy completed the sea blockade in the Mediterranean, whereas today, through her attitude of non-belligerency—in other words a neutrality favorable to Germany—she keeps a large hole open which was closed in the last war.

In the last war Italy on land, Serbia, Greece and Rumania on land in the Balkans, and Russia on land from the Baltic to the Black Sea, completed the encirclement of Germany. This made the blockade complete. What added to Germany's difficulties was her armed forces on land which had to withstand the assaults of two and a half to three million Russians, approximately a million Balkan people and a million and a half to two million Italians, as well as two million British in France, two and a half to three million French, and ultimately two million Americans as well.

[1]The first world war of modern times was the War of the Spanish Succession which the American Colonists called Queen Anne's War and helped Britain fight; the second was the Seven Years' War in which the American Colonists fought, and the third consisted of the wars of the French Revolution and Napoleonic period into which the United States was finally drawn from 1812-1815.

It is true that the last time she had the help of the Hungarians, the Bulgars and the Turks. However, the forces furnished by these three were but a small offset to the large number of Russians and Italians fighting her then but not doing so now.

Not only do all these holes, closed from 1914 to 1918, exist in the blockade of Germany today, but what is more dangerous for the Allies, the German army of today is more powerful than was the German army from 1914 to 1918. This, despite the fact that many of the enlisted men have had less training than was true of the Imperial German army.

Except for Italy, Germany is the only nation which has worked out the most effective use for war purposes of aviation and mechanization. German and Italian experimentation on Spanish Civil War battlefields showed that neither aviation nor mechanized forces such as tanks, tractor drawn artillery and armored cars when operating alone or together could produce decisive results. Instead, they found that their combined use with the older arms, the infantry, the horsed artillery and the horsed cavalry was necessary to gain victory.

Italy tried out these methods with great success in Albania. Germany used them in Poland, with the result that she had won in eighteen days. Even those military people who, like the author, had witnessed combat in Spain and who also had seen the Polish Army in combat thought it would take several months. In Norway, the Germans once more provided the effectiveness of these methods as against brave troops not trained and properly armed to meet them successfully in battle.

Russia's blundering attempt to imitate these methods in Finland only serves to emphasize the difference between German efficiency and Russian inefficiency. In other words, possession of modern armament by a poorly trained and poorly led Army will not do the job. Highly trained officers and men are necessary if victory is to be had and above all to be had with only reasonable losses.

These quick defeats add to the difficulties of the Allies, for the small neutrals, seeing the dramatic and sudden death of independence of those countries which have dared defy Germany, naturally are more and more going to submit to German demands. In other words, they are going to disobey those demands issued by the Allies in their efforts to enforce the economic blockade of Germany. Denmark did not even make an effort to resist. Sweden is now within the German orbit. The author visited all the Balkan countries after a visit to Albania just as the Italians took it over. Even at that time he found everywhere a fear of the German and Italian military power which made these Balkan peoples disinclined in any way to oppose those two countries.

Therefore, at the time of writing, there seems to be no indication that the military powers of the Allies will be able for some time to come to overcome the economic bloc set up in Europe in opposition to the economies which are basic to the three great democracies.

The situation in the Far East is similar. Japan, through her control of the whole seacoast of Asia, the principal ports and river communications of China, can dominate the trade and financial dealings of the rest of the world with China and of China with the rest of the world.

In between the European bloc, hostile to Allied economics, and Japan, controlling those of the Far East, lies Russia. Already she is virtually an ally of Germany. She is showing increasing signs of giving up her enmity to Japan.

This growing economic and anti-democratic bloc, backed by tremendous military power, constitutes a steadily increasing political and economic challenge to the U. S. A. The Atlantic and Pacific oceans may prevent our being attacked militarily by this bloc but cannot save us from drastic economic competition after the war is over, if it is not destroyed by the war. Such competition will drastically decrease the opportunities for our young people.

Universal Military Service an Ancient Democratic Institution

Until the Munich surrender to Germany in 1939, there were only three countries in the world which did not insist that every citizen have military training in the armed forces in time of peace, as well as in war.

They were China, Great Britain and the United States. Since 1937, the Chinese, though a nation of at least 400,000,000, have had to suffer the humiliation of a succession of military defeats which left all their principal seaports and most of their principal river and overland communications in the hands of the Japanese Army and Navy. This, though Japan has a population of but 80,000,000. It is simply one more chapter of a series of humiliating Chinese reverses which began with the war of 1894-95. In that war, Japan's smaller navy defeated China's larger and more modern one, while the Japanese Army drove more numerous Chinese forces out of Korea, Lower Manchuria and Port Arthur.

Back of the Munich surrender was more than any political desires for appeasement as a means of escaping war. There was the realization that Britain was so weak on land that Germany did not fear any war threats made by the British. As a consequence, on April 27, 1939, more than four months before war broke out, the British Par-

liament passed a conscript law calling for the military training of Britain's youth in time of peace.

The idea that required military service in time of peace is not democratic is founded on an ignorance of history and inherited prejudices brought from Europe by our ancestors.

One of the oldest principles recorded by history is the obligation of the citizen of a State to defend it with arms in return for the privileges of citizenship. Training with arms in time of peace in order to enable a citizen to perform his duties as a soldier in time of war was never challenged in the democracies of the past.

The first challenge to the right of government to demand military service came when governments ceased to be democratic. As the interest of these governments drifted away from interests of the mass of the people, it was inevitable that objections should be made to fighting for the government and thereby against the interest of the average individual.

The history of the rise of nationality constituting the European political states, from which the ancestors of most Americans came, gradually developed into a struggle between the monarch and the feudal lords. Under the feudal system these lords raised the armed forces the King needed when called upon by him to do so. The kings, in seeking to deprive the great nobles of their semi-independent positions, were hampered in their struggle to centralize the government by the fact that it was only through those nobles they could raise armies. Consequently, they had to develop private armies of their own with officers and soldiers who owed allegiance only to them. The adventurous foreigner, unable to remain in his own country for one reason or another, frequently offered his services to some other monarch. Thus, the King of France had in his private army, as distinguished from the French Army proper, large numbers of Scotch and Irish. When a king wanted to fight an unpopular war—particularly a war on foreign soil—he simply went into the market for bands of mercenaries.

In the fifteenth century, there were numerous bands of professional soldiers called "Free Companies." Many were of German and Swiss origin. Others were Spanish, French and Italian. A few were English. They simply sold their services to any ruler who could pay.

Thus, in all of the older countries, there grew up a distinction between the army maintained, or raised from time to time by the king for his own purposes, and the levies, under arms, of the citizens or subjects raised to defend their country against an invader.

As the King's troops were quartered on the countryside in time of war and occasionally in time of peace, frequently without financial

recompense, the mass of the people naturally developed a strong dislike for them. This feeling was added to as the small towns of the feudal ages grew into cities during the Renaissance. For the purpose of protecting itself, each city had its own armed bands. During the period of centralization in which the kings succeeded in subduing their nobles and changing them from semi-independent war lords into courtiers idling around the king's court, the towns generally sided with the monarchs. They had suffered too much from the nobles. The consequence was that while the idea, that every citizen or subject owed military service, remained, it more and more became limited in its application. The first really efficient standing army dependent upon the King only was the French Army of Louis XIV. Its manpower was partially raised by a limited conscription, but its pay and promotion, its armament, equipment, clothing and food came from the King. His great war minister, Vonvois, saw to that.

The growth of the towns resulted in the rise of the bourgeosie who replaced the nobles as the main opponents to the king. The king, upheld by his private army, which owed allegiance not to the country but to him, used this army to uphold his views in these quarrels. The Bourgeosie took their revenge by withholding or trying to withhold the money needed by the king to pay his private army.

In Saxon times, in England, every man from sixteen to sixty years was liable for military service. When called, he had to appear fully armed and equipped at his own expense.

The Normans, after the conquest, imposed the feudal system by which land tenure and the obligation to give military service went together. This change was important for two reasons. First, it made the mass of the people owe their service to their feudal lords and not to the king. Second, the service was limited to forty days a year.

The Plantagenet Kings got around this by accepting payment in money in lieu of service. It is interesting to note that this idea found its expression in our Civil War when a drafted man could escape service by buying a substitute.

In England, as on the Continent, the time came when the king and the Parliament engaged in a struggle, the king fighting to maintain control of the "King's Army," while insisting Parliament provide the necessary money; the Parliament, on the other hand, insisting that in return for the money Parliament should have considerable control.

This fight had a great deal to do with the Revolution in which King Charles I lost his head. During this revolution Parliament formed its own Army which ultimately under Cromwell laid much of the foundation of the British Regular Army of today.

The restoration of monarchy, however, gave back to the king considerable control of the Regular Army. Therefore, once more the Army in legal language became "the King's Army." Thus, the Regular Army has often been associated in the minds of the people with the idea that it belonged to their opponents in their fight for democracy.

This prejudice was brought to this country by the original settlers and the subsequent immigrants. The Revolutionary War, in which the American Colonists fought the King's troops of the British Regular, heightened this prejudice.

Yet the first standing army of modern times to owe allegiance, not to any individual but to a Constitution instead, is the Regular Army of the United States. It owes obedience to the President of the United States in the legitimate performance of his duty under the Constitution but nothing more.

Unfairness of the Volunteer System

In 1914, when war broke out, Britain started raising her army by volunteering. Those like Lord Roberts, who advocated conscription as the only method both fair to the country and to the individual, were not listened to. This, on the ground that it was un-English to conscript men for service in the armed forces.

Arriving in France from the Orient, as the First Battle of the Marne came to a close, I soon found that the great question was how long it would take Britain to raise her new army in order that France and Britain could attack, drive back and defeat the Germans. The French had approximately one million trained soldiers in the First Battle of the Marne. The British had less than 100,000 effectives. Two of the six Infantry Divisions, which with one Cavalry Division, made up the Expeditionary Force had not been sent to France. Those troops which had arrived had suffered heavily in casualties during the first battles and the long retreat to the Marne.

I, therefore, went to England to watch the interesting process of raising an army in a country with the same blood and prejudices as those of the United States. It was my thought that any lessons learned would be of value should we enter the war. After all, while the professional American officer knew the mistakes we had made in hastily raising armies to fight our Civil War, most of the American public did not.

I soon found that the same troubles existed. The bravest and best and most conscientious volunteered first. Thousands who should have been trained as officers, thus insuring better leadership for troops

raised later, went out as privates, only in too many cases to be killed. These losses deprived their country of the advantages inherent in having such men as officers.

After driving an American ambulance on the British front in France during the fall of 1914, I became more than ever convinced of the unfairness of the volunteer system to both the country and the individual. During this period I saw older men, married, with children, who having served in the Regular Army were naturally called back to fight in its ranks, while many a young, unmarried man stayed at home in his civilian job. This, not because of physical cowardice, but through a lack of understanding of the seriousness of the war and the terrible necessity for raising a large army. I saw the enthusiasm with which the newly raised volunteer troops entered the field, and something of the penalty they paid for their lack of training.

I learned at first hand what the history of our Civil War had taught me—that not the volunteer system but only universal training in peace and service in war is fair to both the country and the individual.

I spent August, 1939, in England. The War Office kindly sent me around to see the new militia brought into the service as the result of the Conscript Law passed by Parliament, April 27, 1939.

What a contrast by comparison with what I had seen during my visits to England in September, 1914, and March, 1915. I saw young men from all classes of society, from farms, workshops, offices, schools, from London and other big cities and country districts in all parts of England.

I saw all the types and classes of young Englishmen for the first time in their lives becoming acquainted with each other, together under exactly the same conditions.

It was easy to pick them out from the regulars in the same garrison. Instead of the bronzed faces and well developed bodies of the regulars, in most cases they had the white faces and none too robust bodies, characteristic of the average boy in civil life because of lack of physical training. However, the physical training to which they were being subjected was beginning to remedy this. One noticeable feature of this training consisted of special exercises to correct such defects as flat feet and spines with too much curvature and other physical defects ordinarily left uncorrected in civil life.

It was interesting to note not only the willingness but the eagerness with which these young men accepted this physical training. There could be no doubt of their realization of its benefit. Indeed, periodical weighing and physical examination gave objective evidence of the benefit of physical training, regular hours, nourishing food and plenty of sleep.

The majority of them were probably for the first time in their lives not only getting more than they wanted to eat, but a balanced diet which had nothing to do with the amount they could afford to spend, as is too often the case of young men working for their living.

The life of a militiaman may sometimes seem hard to the boy whose parents have given him everything. There can be no doubt that to those of his fellows who have had to earn their own living, and a large percentage have, the reverse is true. There is no worry about losing the job. The constant problem of how to pay for lodging, meals and clothes, is non-existent. The daily schedule is less long and onerous than the day's work in most civil occupations. It was easy for anyone accustomed to handling considerable numbers of boys or men, to see that the militiamen are, with possibly few exceptions, not only content but pleased with their new surroundings in life. All this, of course, has only to do with the selfish, individual side of the militiaman's service.

What about the benefits to their nation—"Britain"?

There could be no doubt. My mind flashed back to what I had seen on my visits to England in 1914 and 1915.

What a contrast between this fair, orderly, democratic training under a well prepared plan in time of peace with the confusion, haste, unfair volunteer system I had seen on those two prior visits!

The result was that despite her unpreparedness on land, Britain entered the war this time with the machinery already smoothly under way to raise whatever size Army she may decide to be necessary.

Increased Cost of National Defense

One objection always brought up to any increase in national defense expenditures is the cost. An examination of our history will show that the tremendous sums spent for our wars are due to our persistent refusal, in time of peace, to face the facts of what constitutes adequate national defense and then meet these facts by a long plan spread over a period of years.

Neither the United States nor Great Britain have paid off the tremendous debts each incurred in the last great war which terminated in November, 1918. The expenditures of each are a matter of record in public documents. Each was confronted with the same problem—trying to rapidly build up an army of millions non-existent when each nation entered the war.

The public records, available to anyone who wants to take the trouble to examine them, offer voluminous proof of how much more

it cost Britain to finally put two million soldiers in France two years after she entered the war, and of the United States to do the same in somewhat less time, than it did France to mobilize two million of her militarily trained citizens immediately war was declared.[2]

Another cost, which is tremendous but more difficult to figure, is the cost resulting from the prolongation of the war due to the fact that two years had to elapse before the British could make their maximum effort and, subsequently, almost another two years before the United States could make its maximum effort.

All this expenditure would have been avoided had both Britain and the United States had a system of universal military service and training for some years prior to the outbreak of the war.[3]

Furthermore, the possibility that had this been true the war would have been avoided, and thus its cost as well, is shown to have been reasonably great by the diplomatic records which have been published since the war. The great question for the German government was not so much whether or not Great Britain would enter the war, the point which has been emphasized to our public, but that if she did enter the war, what military aid could she send to France immediately.

The Germans knew that the maximum strength of the British troops immediately available was 120,000. They knew, and the campaign proved, that while this number could be of material aid, it could not be decisive where millions were involved.

Had the British seen fit to adopt the advice of Lord Roberts and the many other Englishmen, who backed him in his campaign for universal military service, the British would have had available a force as big as that of the French army.

Had this been the case, it is extremely doubtful if the Germans would have gone to war.

Exactly the same consideration was the governing factor when President Wilson threatened the Germans with the entry of the United States into the war. The Germans knew the chaotic condition of our national defense, so completely proved by the mobilization of our National Guard and its concentration with the Regulars available on the Mexican border.

They knew that many months must elapse before we could put enough troops in France and at the front to counterbalance the reinforcement to their forces on the Western Front, which resulted from Russia's dropping out of the war. German troops thus freed from

[2]This 2,000,000 figure in each case is an approximation, in order to make a better comparison. However, it is near enough the truth to answer this purpose.

[3]See Statement of General John J. Pershing contained in Hearings on the National Defense, 1920.

the Eastern Front and transferred to the Western Front made possible the series of great offensives, which began with the March, 1918, drive against the British.

The Germans were convinced that, with these reinforcements from the Eastern Front, they could beat both the British and the French and win the war on the battlefield before the American reinforcement could arrive.

Lloyd George summed it up when he said, about this time, that it was a race between President Wilson and the Kaiser.

The last great German offensive, that of July 15, 1918, made in Champagne, France, came so near to success that those who were in it will always remember that the Germans just missed winning the race.[4] This attack began the Second Battle of the Marne. Before that battle was over nearly 300,000 Americans had fought in it, of whom approximately 60,000 had been killed or wounded in action. When this last German attack failed, had the Allies lacked the reserves necessary to make a counter attack, the war could have ended in a stalemate.

It was the American reinforcement which gave Marshal Foch the reserve for which he had been continuously struggling since he was put in command of the Allied forces. He knew and continuously argued that without such a reserve he could not make any counter attacks. The first of these was the Franco-American attack of July 18. It began the offensive part of the Second Battle of the Marne. The second counter attack was an Anglo-French one begun August 8th. The continual arrival in large numbers of the American reinforcement enabled the Allies to continue their offensive until the Germans asked for an armistice. A total of 1,400,000 Americans were in action before the armistice came. Without this reinforcement the series of allied offensives could not have been made, with the result the Germans would have been able to demand peace on the basis of the stalemate which would have existed after the failure of their Champagne offensive. Even with this series of Allied offensives the German army marched back to Germany still intact as an army. As a consequence, the peace obtained was not a decisive one.

High Cost of National Defense Due to Unpreparedness

This waiting until war comes before getting ready is the main reason for the high cost of our national defense, by comparison with all other nations except Great Britain, which does the same thing. It could be avoided if we would spend, as do these other nations, a reasonable amount yearly on a carefully worked out, long range plan for national defense.

[4]The author faced this offensive near Suippe, the center of the German attack, while serving in the 42nd U. S. (Rainbow) Infantry division as a brigade commander of Infantry.—Ed.

On the contrary, in time of peace, we always do the same thing—make no such plan. Having no plan, large sums of the money appropriated yearly are spent on items not essential to National Defense and sometimes even detrimental to it. The maintenance of unnecessary army posts and navy yards and other items of great interest to the localities in which they may happen to be are the best examples of this.

More than one hundred years ago a Board of Navy Commodores was ordered to make a careful investigation as to whether or not navy yards then existing on the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts were necessary. This was the day of sail—no railways, no telegraph or telephones or wireless or aviation—in other words, slow and uncertain communications. Yet the Board decided that but two of the then existing navy yards were necessary.

Despite the tremendous increase in means of communication and its efficiency, all these navy yards are still in existence today. Furthermore, in the more than hundred years since all but two were recommended to be abolished, many millions of dollars have been spent.

As the settlers of the United States progressively moved west many small army posts had to be established to protect them from the Indians. Though the time has long since passed when most of them have any military value whatsoever, a large number are still being maintained and garrisoned. In most cases they have been added to since originally built. In practically all cases the cost of the maintenance of troops in these out of the way places is far beyond what would be necessary for the same troops stationed near one of our great railway centers or seaports.

The army knows it. From time to time, it has given Congress voluminous figures to prove it. Nevertheless, if there is any reduction in the army expenses, it is by getting rid of combat soldiers, such as infantrymen, artillerymen and cavalrymen, not by getting rid of unnecessary expensive army posts.[5]

When Mr. Weeks was Secretary of War, he produced the figures to prove that excessive economy in the combat branches of the army was seriously impairing its value both for purposes of combat and as a training force for the civilian components in peace and the draft in war. He showed that as a consequence the time would come when only by the expenditure of very large sums would it be possible to put the Army in a condition to function once more.

[5]General Leonard Wood, when Chief of Staff, made a long unsuccessful effort to that end.

Some years later when General MacArthur was Chief of Staff, Congress asked him how much money was needed to put the army once more in a reasonable state of efficiency They were horrified at the amount of money needed. When they protested, he explained that it was due to letting the plant run down, with the result that a large part of it had to be rebuilt. He pointed out that had they spent a reasonable amount on maintenance every year for the preceding fifteen years, nothing like this sum would have been necessary. He did not get the sum he asked for.

In our haste to make good our deficiencies when war comes, we spend many times the sum which would have been necessary, had we had a plan and followed it by means of an orderly program year by year in the period of peace.

When we make comparisons of our national defense with the national defense of other countries, as is done from time to time in the Foreign Policy Association pamphlets, nearly always the comparison is based upon how much money we spend for national defense by comparison with that spent by other nations. Almost never is the comparison based on how many combat soldiers, ships and planes we get by comparison with other nations. That, of course, is the only basis for a proper comparison of the national defense of different nations.

There isn't an officer of the regular army and navy of experience who does not know that if the appropriations for the army and navy could be freed from all political objectives and confined purely to military ones we could obtain more national defense for fewer dollars.[6]

Military Training Does Not Lead to Militarism

One of the principal objections to military training made by many is that it leads to militarism. Seldom do the people who hurl this charge define what they mean by militarism. If they mean the encouragement of a desire for aggressive warfare as a means of acquiring property and profit which cannot be gotten through legitimate peaceful methods, the answer is best found in an examination of everything which is taught the young man in the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, National Guard, R.O.T.C. and C.M.T.C.

Any such examination will quickly bring such a charge to the ground, as there is not the slightest trace of any such teaching to be found anywhere.

[6]The annual hearings before both Houses of Congress on the appropriation bills for the War and Navy Departments contain exhaustive financial details. The annual reports of the Secretaries of War and Navy with the reports of their subordinates contain many financial details.

If militarism means being taught respect for the rights of others, an understanding that an individual has obligations to be fulfilled towards other individuals, towards the community in which he lives and towards his nation, and that these obligations include service under arms in time of war, then the charge is correct.

In other words, the young men who undergo military training are taught to be exactly the opposite of the sloppy, selfish, physically under-developed, young people too often met with, who do not wish to submit to any discipline, who want jobs and posts for which they are not fitted, who do not want to do the hard work necessary to fit themselves for such posts and jobs, who think the world owes them a living and who want to take everything from life and give nothing in return.

In fact, the more an examination is made of the benefits accruing from military training in time of peace, the more it becomes evident that every tendency is to strengthen the principles upon which democracy rests.[7] Once these principles become soft or disappear, inevitably there follows the fall of democracy and the substitution for it of communism or some other form of chaos, or else a Fascist dictatorship.

There is nothing more important for the maintenance of democracy than a strong sense of obligation on the part of its citizens. This starts with the daily life of each.

If each does not feel obligated to perform the duties of a citizen in helping the police in every way to suppress crime, through unwillingness to give the time necessary to make complaints or to appear in court as a witness or through fear, then inevitably the crime situation will be the disgraceful one which it has been in a number of years past in the United States.

If each citizen does not feel obligated to live up to the political rights of citizenship by taking an interest in the legislation being enacted by the different political bodies of the country, if he or she takes no interest or part in political campaigns, and above all fails to vote, then politics will inevitably fall into the hands of and be run by political machines.

No better example of the dangers to our youth from a lack of sense of responsibility, coupled with a belief that everything is owed to the individual and that nothing should be demanded from them, was furnished than by the Youth Congress in Washington, D. C.

The fundamental military teaching of a sense of obligation, summed up in the words "the inevitability of the performance of duty," is an

[7]"Universal Training for National Defense" by John Erskine.

answer to all sure failures of citizenship. Discipline is not synonymous with tyranny nor is liberty synonymous with license.

There is ample evidence of the educational value of military training in various reports on investigations carried out to determine whether or not it is desirable.[8]

Low Physical Standards in U. S.

The application of the draft in 1917-18 gave the figures which show beyond any reasonable doubt that the mass of the young men of the nation do not possess a high physical rating.[9] All data gathered since then confirms this.

Probably no better sample can be had than the boys appointed year after year to take the entrance examination to the Military Academy at West Point, as every Congressional district of the country is represented. Many of these boys have excellent high school or college records. The entrance examination at West Point makes the fullest allowance for youth and the possibility for development under the system which obtains there. Yet in 1939, out of 1,551 candidates examined, 521 were rejected physically.

At West Point, besides the many compulsory military drills involving considerable physical exertion, athletics are compulsory. For a period of six years the average gain for the new cadet during his first year has been 3/10 of an inch in height, 8.4 lbs. in weight, and 1.1 inches in chest measurement.

Outside of the Naval Academy and a few military schools, none of our schools, even where a certain amount of physical training is compulsory, begin to give every student the physical training received at West Point.

The very large number of our youth who do not go to college receive little or no physical training.

Comparison of Civilian Conservation Corps With R. O. T. C. and C. M. T. C. Shows Advantage of Military Training

The claim is frequently made that all these benefits can be obtained in other ways than by military training.

[8]See: (a) Letter of L. R. G., page 8, The P. M. S. & T., May, 1939, 1653 Penn. Ave., N. W., Washington, D. C. (b) "A Study of the Educational Value of Military Instruction in Universities and Colleges," Pamphlet 28, U. S. Dept. of Interior, Washington, D. C., 1932. (c) "Statements by Presidents of Universities and Colleges on the Educational Value of Military Training," 1935, Civilian Military Education Fund, Washington, D. C. (d) "Military Training as a Factor in Educaton" by Sveinbjorn Johnson.

[9]See: (a) Defects found in Drafted Men, prepared under Direction of the Surgeon General, Senate Print., 66th Congress, 1st Session, 1919. (b) Universal Training for National Defense by John Erskine. (c) Hearings on National Defense, 1917 and 1920. (d) Inquiry by Office of Education, Dept. of Interior, 1932.

Today the CCC is being pointed to as an answer. That the CCC has greatly benefited the boys who have been and are members of it is beyond question. That these boys have given the country a certain return by the work which they have done is also beyond question.

That the CCC boy can compare in physique, in alertness, in orderly habits of mind as well as body and above all in a sense of obligation to his country with the R.O.T.C. and C.M.T.C. boys is not beyond question. It is true that the CCC camps are greatly improved since they were first started. The possession of a uniform has greatly helped the self-respect of the boys in these camps.

However, the fact remains, as any open-minded visitor to these camps can see, that they lack the spur furnished by military training to the boy himself. Nor do they teach these boys, who would be drafted in case of war, the military knowledge necessary to avoid the really awful loss of life and limb inevitable when hastily trained troops meet well trained ones in battle.

Anyone who has visited the CCC camps and the summer Citizens' Military Training Camps cannot but be struck by the contrast in the attitude of the boys themselves. Though the C.M.T.C. camps last for only a month, the boys in them maintain a higher standard of orderliness, physical and mental alertness. Also, they thoroughly understand that as citizens of the United States they have a definite obligation to their country.

The need for military training in the CCC camps is shown by the practically spontaneous increase in the adoption of military methods. There is little doubt that, if left to the boys in these camps, the majority of them would favor a certain amount of military training. In three recent Gallup polls, 75 per cent of citizens interviewed have favored military training in these camps.

The Cost the Untrained Pay in Dead and Wounded

Nothing was said at the time, due to the censorship, and little has been said since, except in American, British and French military journals, of the waste of human life and limb which resulted from the inefficiency of the average American and British soldier in comparison with the average German soldier because of their lack of training.

This is one of the facts recently brought out in an article published in both our Infantry and Coast Artillery Journals.[10] In three comparatively quiet periods, the summer of '15, the winter of '15-'16 and early in 1918, the British lost 75,845, while the Germans lost but 33,720. The relative American and German losses for different periods have

[10]"Attack or Defense" by Major Thomas R. Phillips, Coast Artillery Corps, U. S. A.

not yet been worked out. However, all officers who commanded American troops at the front, as did the author, know from the dead on the battlefield, as well as from watching attacks, that our losses were always far greater than those of the Germans and that the reason was simply the lack of skill on the part of our soldiers, due to their meager training before entering battle.

The evidence is voluminous that nothing was more costly in the last war, both in dollars and human lives and limbs, than the fact that the United States and Britain, being the only two of the combatants which had not trained their young men in time of peace for service in war, sent them into battle relatively untrained by comparison with their enemies.

The terrible toll paid by the relatively untrained when facing the highly trained, particularly with modern weapons on land and in the air, is shown by the downfall of the Poles in eighteen days and the Norwegians in twenty-three.

Those quick German victories were not due to overwhelming numbers. They were due to the highest type of efficient use of modern armament in what the Germans call "Blitzkrieg"; that is, lightning war, plus ruthless surprise tactics and the use of intrigue.

Since the author in 1938 saw this type of war being worked out on Spanish Civil War battlefields by the Germans, Italians and Spanish, he has been endeavoring to get some attention paid in this country to the terrible power of Blitzkrieg. He has been unsuccessful.

Articles sent from Spain, though non-political, were refused publication.[11] Since his return home, he has been unable to get articles on Blitzkrieg and what it means in either newspapers or popular magazines of national circulation.

There seems to be a complete inability to understand the tremendously powerful weapon Germany has developed. Our army could not resist it any better than did the Poles. To send young men recently taken from civil life and with no more training than they had in 1918 would mean sending them to wholesale slaughter. This cannot be overemphasized.

Proposed System for Universal Training in U. S.

The practical question which comes up is what would be the best military system for the United States to adopt to insure two things The first is to insure having in time of war an adequate number of highly trained professional soldiers. The second is to have universal military training for all young men in time of peace. This, so they

[11]Later published in England and France.

may start civil life with the benefits accruing to them from such training and be ready, should war come, to defend their country with the minimum loss of life and limb, the minimum expenditure of money and victory within a short period of time.

Probably, in general, the French Republic, through its military system, indicates the best route to be followed. They have two classes of soldiers. The first is the professional soldier who spends his life in the army. The second is the ordinary citizen who wants to spend his life as a civilian but who recognizes that he owes military service to his country in time of war and, therefore, should undergo military training in time of peace. This, so he will have the maximum chance as a trained soldier to survive the war and, for the same reason, give his country the maximum chance to be victorious.

The French professional soldier is divided into two groups. The first consists of those officers and enlisted men who voluntarily enter the Colonial Army, the French Army, which can be ordered anywhere in the world for service. While most of this army in time of peace is stationed in the French colonies, there is always a considerable number, both white and native, who are stationed in France.

The second consists of those officers and enlisted men who remain in France to train the French young men during their compulsory military service. These professionals, with the drafted young men whom they are training, make up the French Metropolitan Army. This is only used in the case of wars threatening France herself.

Following this general idea, there would be no need to materially change our present military set-up in order to establish compulsory universal military training. After deciding the minimum amount of military knowledge necessary, each boy could be given the choice as to where he would acquire it. He could get it in one continuous period in the Regular Army, Navy or Marine Corps, or in a number of periods in the National Guard, R.O.T.C., C.M.T.C. or C.C.C.

The Chief of Staff of the Army, General Marshall, is already hard at work organizing a certain number of highly trained divisions of the Regular Army made up of professional, volunteer officers and soldiers. These divisions at home, with the regulars in Panama, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, the Philippines and Alaska, would correspond in general to the French Colonial Army.

There is already a considerable number of officers, and non-commissioned officers, of the Regular Army on duty with the civilian components.

This number could be increased by having Congress authorize such increase as might be necessary. In addition, there is no reason against,

and many reasons for, the use of Reserve officers and non-commissioned officers for the year following their commissioning as officers, or given warrants as non-commissioned officers.

The National Guard could be left as it is, with the proviso that such young men as chose to do their military service in its ranks, would be required to do whatever additional training might be considered necessary.[12] This training to be under the supervision of the regular officers and non-commissioned officers attached to the Guard as instructors.

Those young men who elected to take their military training in college or high school could do so in existing R.O.T.C. units or, where they do not exist today, in ones formed for that purpose. Where the military instruction is not of a sufficiently high standard, additional hours should be assigned.

Those choosing to take their service in the C.M.T.C. should have a three month course instead of the present one month, with the daily training considerably augmented. Probably there should also be the requirement that they attend camp two or three summers.

The existing set-up of national defense in the United States, through nothing more than expansion, could be used to provide adequate training in time of peace for the young manhood of the country.

The additional money necessary would not be a tremendous sum, if existing national defense expenditures had all moneys spent for political purposes eliminated and every cent a contribution to the military defense of the United States of America.

The probabilities are that such a system would be popular. It is not lack of boys and young men anxious to have military training which keeps the R.O.T.C. and the C.M.T.C. at their present figures.

Each year many more boys ask for this training than can get it.

Limited appropriations and objections from the War Department are responsible.

One of the principal objections constantly brought up by the War Department to the increase of military training facilities for civilian components is the lack of sufficient regular army officers.

It is putting the cart before the horse to limit the number of men who can be trained because of lack of sufficient officers. This is all the more true when, as is the case at present, it is not a question of finding enough officers to train all the youth of the United States, but

[12]Probably a recruit period of continuous intensive training similar to that of the Swiss recruit period. During a recent visit to Switzerland, the author was struck by the recent training he saw. Essentials were emphasized and non-essentials eliminated.

simply enough to train the number today who, under our volunteer system, are asking for this training.

In other words, quite aside from the question of universal military training and service is the immediate one of providing enough instructors, so that no American youth who wants military training will be denied it.

One answer, already adopted by the War Department, is to order retired army officers to this duty. Many of these officers are only suffering from some physical defect which might interfere in the case of hard, active service, but which in no way impairs their efficiency as military instructors.

Another way in which instructors can be found is to order a greater number of Reserve officers to active duty each year. At present, the appropriations allow but 30,000 of 103,000 to be trained for two weeks each year. This, of course, means that the average Reserve officer does not begin to receive the training necessary to make him reasonably efficient.

One of the greatest difficulties faced by Great Britain today is the lack of Reserve officers with which to train the young men brought in by the draft law passed April 27, 1938. Not only are these officers needed for new troops but they are also needed so that regular officers can go to the front instead of being held back in England for purposes of training.

When I was in England, the month of August just prior to the outbreak of the war, and visited the regular army depots where the new militia was being trained, I heard constantly the same complaint. It was that only a small number could be trained at any one time due to the fact that the regular army had to do the training and only had a small number of officers and non-commissioned officers available.

I was struck by the contrast between this situation and that in France. The French system of universal compulsory service automatically trains a large number of Reserve officers and non-commissioned officers. Moreover, these civilians give their spare time to taking additional training, in order to pass the examinations necessary for promotion. Thanks to knowing General Niessel, a retired officer, devoting most of his time to this work, I saw quite a little of the Reserve officers and non-commissioned officers. I know they have a high professional standard.

Neither Nations Nor Their Citizens Can Escape Competition

The United States as a nation in the world cannot escape the competition of the other nations in the struggle for existence any more

than an individual in a community can escape the competition of the other individuals of that community. The individual American citizen cannot take advantage of every right which his citizenship entitles him to without putting back the equivalent in the shape of the acceptance of the responsibilities of citizenship. That is the thing which must be done to maintain the principles upon which the country is founded.

No individual expects to keep drawing upon a bank account without ever making deposits. He or she knows that even if the bank permitted it bankruptcy would be the inevitable end. Yet we have that idea abroad in the nation today, and more and more are allowing our young people to believe that they are entitled to everything their personal wants make them desire. At the same time some of these young people more and more deny the right of the nation as a whole, and the State and community in which they live, to demand in return the things which are essential if the community, the State and the Nation are to continue to be able to give each citizen the opportunities enjoyed today.

The Bill of Rights, inserted in the Constitution as a safeguard against tyranny on the part of the Government, is now being interpreted by some as a license to escape all responsibility towards the government and fellow citizens and even as a means of overturning the government without having to face the dangers of arrest, trial and conviction for treason.

Part of the plan to break down our present form of government is to encourage our young people to believe that they have a right to what they want; that if they do not get what they want, someone is responsible and must be punished. Many well-meaning people, who would be horrified at the thought of overturning our government, encourage this process by teaching the young that they are entitled to jobs; that they are entitled to a high standard of living by comparison with the rest of the world; that they are entitled to escape war.

Of course, all this is contrary to the lessons of history. It definitely proves, whether people like it or not, that it is not a question of whether individuals or nations want to face the competition of other individuals and nations but that they have got to face it successfully or yield to the individuals and nations which determinedly do face it.

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